Abstract. Content-Centric Networking (CCN) is an internetworking paradigm that offers an alternative to today's IP-based Internet Architecture. Instead of focusing on hosts and their locations, CCN emphasizes addressable named content. By decoupling content from its location, CCN allows opportunistic in-network content caching, thus enabling better network utilization, at least for scalable content distribution. However, in order to be considered seriously, CCN must support basic security services, including content authenticity, integrity, confidentiality, authorization and access control. Current approaches rely on content producers to perform authorization and access control, which is typically attained via public key encryption. This general approach has several disadvantages. First, consumer privacy vis-a-vis producers is not preserved. Second, identity management and access control impose high computational overhead on producers. Also, unnecessary repeated authentication and access control decisions must be made for each content request. (This burden is particularly relevant for resource-limited producers, e.g., anemic IoT devices.) These issues motivate our design of KRB-CCN -a complete authorization and access control system for private CCN networks. Inspired by Kerberos in IP-based networks, KRB-CCN involves distinct authentication and authorization authorities. By doing so, KRB-CCN obviates the need for producers to make consumer authentication and access control decisions. KRB-CCN preserves consumer privacy since producers are unaware of consumer identities. Producers are also not required to keep any hard state and only need to perform two symmetric key operations to guarantee that sensitive content is confidentially delivered only to authenticated and authorized consumers. Furthermore, KRB-CCN works transparently on the consumer side. Most importantly, unlike prior designs, KRB-CCN leaves the network (i.e., CCN routers) out of any authorization, access control or confidentiality issues. We describe KRB-CCN design and implementation, analyze its security, and report on its performance.
communication [1, 2] . All CCN content is uniquely named. Content producers are entities that publish content under namespaces. Entities that wish to obtain content, called consumers, do so by issuing an interest message specifying desired content by its unique name. The network is responsible for forwarding the interest, based on the content name, to the nearest copy of requested content. Interests do not carry source or destination addresses. Each interest leaves state in every router it traverses. This state is later used to forward, along the reverse path, requested content back to the consumers. As content is forwarded to the consumer, each router can choose to cache it. If a popular content is cached, subsequent interests for it can be satisfied by the caching router and not forwarded further. This can lead to lower delays, better throughput and improved network utilization.
Due to CCN's unique characteristics, security focus shifts from securing hostto-host tunnels to securing the content itself. CCN mandates that each content must be signed by its producer. This is the extent of CCN network-layer security. In particular, CCN does not make any provisions for confidentiality, authorization or access control, leaving these issues to individual applications. We believe that this approach makes sense, since involving the network (i.e., routers) in such issues is generally problematic for both performance and security reasons.
Access control (AC) in CCN has been explored in recent years. Most approaches [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] rely on using public key encryption to safeguard content (we overview these approaches in Section 6). Specifically, producers are expected to encrypt content with a public key corresponding to an authorized consumer, or a group thereof. The latter use their corresponding private keys to decrypt. Although it seems to work, this approach exhibits several problems:
-First, producers are responsible for handling consumer authentication and content AC on their own. Thus, they must deal with (1) consumer identity management and authentication, (2) AC policy representation and storage, (3) updates of access rights, and (4) content encryption. In some cases, producers might not want (or be able) to deal with this burden, e.g., resourceconstrained IoT devices. On the consumer side, this means keeping track of producer-specific authentication contexts and keys. -Second, AC enforced by producers implies sacrificing consumer privacy, which is an important and appealing CCN feature. Since CCN interests do not carry source addresses, a content producer (or a router) normally does not learn the identity of the consumer. However, if the producer enforces AC, it learns consumers identities. -Third, if a set of producers belong to the same administrative domain and each producer enforces its AC policy, it is difficult to react to policy changes, e.g., access revocation for a given consumer or a consumer's credential. Implementing such changes requires notifying each producer individually. -Finally, since public keys bind authorization rules to identities, authentication of consumers is attained via consumer-owned private keys. However, if consumer is authenticated by other means, e.g., passwords and biometrics, each producer would have to store and manage potentially sensitive state information (password files or biometric templates) for each consumer. Since mid-1980s, Kerberos [10] has been successfully and widely used to address these exact issues in private IP-based networks or so-called stub Autonomous Systems. Kerberos de-couples authentication and authorization services via short-term tickets. It also allows services (e.g., storage, compute or web servers) to be accessed by clients over a secure ephemeral session. By checking a client's ticket for freshness of authentication information, a service limits the period of vulnerability due to revocation.
In this paper, we present KRB-CCN, a system inspired by Kerberos for authentication and access control (AC) enforcement in CCN, that aims at addressing the aforementioned issues 1 . KRB-CCN treats consumer authentication and authorization as separate services. It uses tickets to allow consumers to convey authorization permissions to servers, e.g., content producers or repositories. Servers use tickets to determine whether requested content should be provided. KRB-CCN also introduces a novel namespace based AC policy, which allows a consumer to securely retrieve content without revealing its identity to the content producer, thus preserving consumer privacy. In addition, KRB-CCN is transparent to the users; they need not be aware of KRB-CCN or perform any additional tasks. It is also completely invisible to the network, i.e., CCN routers are unaware of KRB-CCN.
Organization: Section 2 overviews CCN and Section 3 overviews Kerberos. Next, Section 4 introduces KRB-CCN, including its system architecture, namespace based AC scheme, and the protocol for authentication, authorization, and secure content retrieval. In addition, a security analysis for the design presented in Section 4 is provided in Appendix A. Then, performance of KRB-CCN is evaluated in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 discusses related work and Section 7 concludes this paper.
CCN Overview
We now overview key features of CCN. Given basic familiarity with CCN, this section can be skipped with no loss of continuity.
In contrast to today's IP-based Internet architecture which focuses on endpoints of communication (i.e., interfaces/hosts and their addresses) CCN [1, 11] centers on content by making it named, addressable, and routable within the network. Moreover, a content must be signed by its producer. A content name is a URI-like string composed of one or more variable-length name segments, separated by the '/' character. To obtain content, a user (consumer) issues an explicit request message, called an interest containing the name of desired content. This interest can be satisfied by either: (1) a router cache, or ( 2) the content producer. A content object message is returned to the consumer upon satisfaction of the interest. Name matching is exact, e.g., an interest for /edu/uni-X/ics/cs/fileA can only be satisfied by a content object named /edu/uni-X/ics/cs/fileA.
In addition to a payload, a content object includes several other fields. In this paper, we are only interested in the following three: Name, Validation, and ExpiryTime. Validation is a composite of validation algorithm information (e.g., the signature algorithm, its parameters, and the name of the public verification key), and validation payload, i.e., the content signature. We use the term "signature" to refer to the entire Validation field. ExpiryTime is an optional, producer-recommended duration for caching a content object. Interest messages carry a name, optional payload, and other fields that restrict the content object response. We refer to [11] for a complete description of all CCN message types, fields and their semantics.
Packets are moved within the network by routers. Each CCN router has two mandatory (and one optional) components:
-Forwarding Interest Base (FIB) -a table of name prefixes and corresponding outgoing interfaces. The FIB is used to route interests based on longestprefix-matching (LPM) of their names. -Pending Interest Table (PIT) -a table of outstanding (pending) interests and a set of corresponding incoming interfaces. -An optional Content Store (CS) used for content caching. The timeout for cached content is specified in the ExpiryTime field of the content header.
From here on, we use the terms CS and cache interchangeably. A router uses its FIB to forward interests toward the producer of requested content. Whereas, a router uses its PIT to forward content along the reverse path towards consumers. Specifically, upon receiving an interest, a router R first checks its cache (if present) to see if it can satisfy this interest locally. In case of a cache miss, R checks its PIT for an outstanding version of the same interest. If there is a PIT match, the new interest's incoming interface is added to the PIT entry. Otherwise, R creates a new PIT entry and forwards the interest to the next hop according to its FIB (if possible). For each forwarded interest, R stores some state information in the PIT entry, including the name in the interest and the interface from which it arrived, such that content may be returned to the consumer. When content is returned, R forwards it to all interfaces listed in the matching PIT entry and then removes the entry. A content that does not match any PIT entry is discarded.
Kerberos Overview
We now summarize Kerberos. We refer to [12] for a more extensive description. Kerberos includes four types of entities: clients, services, an Authentication Server (AS), and a Ticket-Granting Server (TGS). The AS/TGS pair (which are often collocated within the same host) is also known as a Key Distribution Center (KDC). Should a new client/user or a new service be added to the network, it must first be properly registered into KDC's (AS and TGS) databases.
In Kerberos' terminology, a realm corresponds to a single administrative domain, e.g., a private network or a stub Autonomous System. Each realm has one KDC and any authorization or AC decision by a KDC is only valid within its realm. Thus, identities, tickets, and encryption keys (see below) are also realmspecific.
Principal is the term used to refer to names of entries in the KDC database. Each user/client and service has an associated principal. User principals are generally their usernames in the system. Service principals are used to specify various applications. A service principal has the format: service/hostname@realm. A service specification is needed in addition to a hostname, since a single host often runs multiple services. With Kerberos operation in IP Networks, principals are resolved to host IP addresses via DNS look-ups [13] . As can be expected, CCN obviates the need for DNS look-ups, since all content objects are uniquely named by design. Moreover, routing is done based on content names. As discussed below, KRB-CCN enforces AC based on content namespaces, instead of service principals.
Each client/user principal (i.e., username) stored in the AS database is associated with a key, which can be either a public-key or a symmetric key derived from the user's password. Also, the same client/user principal also exists in the TGS database. However, it is associated with a list principals for services that such user has permission to access.
Before attempting to access any content, a client must first authenticate to its local AS. This is done by either typing a password, or proving possession of a secret key associated with the client's identity in the AS database. If the client proves its identity, AS issues a Ticket-Granting Ticket (TGT) -a temporary proof of identity required for the authorization. This TGT might be cached and used multiple times until its expires.
The client uses a valid TGT to request, from TGS, authorization for a service. The TGS is responsible for access control decisions -verifying whether the requested service is within the set of permitted services for the identity ascertained in the provided TGT. If the result is positive, TGS issues a Service Ticket (ST) to be used for requesting the actual service.
KRB-CCN Design
There are three fundamental requirements for any authentication and authorization system. First, AC policies must effectively bind identities to their access rights. Second, once AC policies are established, there must be a way to enforce them, thus preventing unauthorized access. Third, authentication mechanisms must ensure that identities can not be spoofed; this includes both producers and consumers. The system must also not involve the network elements (i.e., routers) where authentication and authorization burden is both misplaced and simply unnecessary.
In the rest of this section, we describe how KRB-CCN achieves each of these requirements. We start by introducing KRB-CCN system architecture and its namespace-based AC policy, which takes advantage of CCN hierarchical content name structure to provide AC based on content prefixes. Next, we describe KRB-CCN communication protocol, which enforces AC policies while providing a single sign-on mechanism for user authentication. Though KRB-CCN is inspired by Kerberos for IP-based networks, it also takes advantage of unique CCN features to effectively satisfy basic authentication and authorization requirements. Throughout the protocol description we discuss the intuition behind the security of KRB-CCN. A detailed security analysis of KRB-CCN is provided in Appendix A.
As it is the case for IP-based Kerberos, KRB-CCN targets private (contentcentric) networks, such as intra-corporation/intra-Autonomous Systems settings. 
System Architecture
Recall that Kerberos has 4 types of entities: AS, TGS, client, and server. A Kerberos realm (domain) typically has one AS/TGS pair, usually collocated in the same host, as well as multiple clients and servers. KRB-CCN also includes four types of entities that map to Kerberos entities as follows:
-Consumer: corresponds to Kerberos client. It issues interests for content and services according to KRB-CCN protocol. Each consumer has an identity and a set of associated permissions registered in the system. -Producer: subsumes one or more Kerberos servers. A producer is required to register its namespace(s) in the system, by registering with a TGS (see below). A single namespace, i.e., a name prefix, can correspond to a single Kerberos server. Alternatively, a group of namespaces of the same producer can be treated as a single server. A producer does not perform any direct consumer authentication or authorization. A producer only checks whether a content-requesting consumer possesses a valid TGS-issued ticket. -As in Kerberos, authentication and authorization are handled by two logically separated entities which can be collocated:
Authentication Server (AS) (aka TGT-Prod): treated as a special type of producer that generates so-called Ticket-Granting Tickets (TGT-s) for consumers once their identities are verified. These tickets can then be used as temporary proofs of identity. We refer to the AS as TGT-Prod. Ticket-Granting Server (TGS) (aka CGT-Prod): performs authorization and is also treated as a special type of producer. Based on a valid consumer TGT and a request to access to a given namespace (server), TGS checks whether this consumer is allowed access to the requested namespace. If so, TGS issues a Content-Granting Ticket (CGT), which proves to the producer that this consumer is granted access to any content under the requested namespace. We refer to TGS as CGT-Prod. Figure 1 illustrates KRB-CCN system architecture. As part of the log-in procedure (aka single sign-on or SSO), a consumer authenticates to TGT-Prod (round 1) and obtains a TGT, which it caches. Whenever a consumer wants to initially access content from a particular producer, it requests authorization from CGT-Prod using its cached TGT (round 2) and obtains a CGT, which it also caches. A CGT authorizes access to one or more namespaces belonging to the same producer. Finally, a consumer requests content from the producer using the corresponding CGT (round 3). TGT and CGT-s remain valid and re-usable until their expiration time runs out. Note that each round (1, 2 and 3) is realized as a single interest-content exchange. Subsequent requests from the namespace(s) specified in the CGT require no involvement of either TGT-Prod or CGT-Prod. A consumer retrieves another content by directly issuing an interest containing the cached CGT. To access content under a different namespace, a consumer uses its cached TGT to contact CGT-Prod and request a new CGT.
For authentication and authorization, KRB-CCN must ensure that TGT-s and CGT-s issued to a specific consumer C r are unforgeable, and not usable by clients other than C r . Moreover, it must make sure that content authorized for C r can only be decrypted by C r . In the rest of this section we go into the details of how KRB-CCN achieves these requirements and functionalities.
Namespace-Based AC Policies
Instead of traditional service principals in Kerberos, KRB-CCN AC policies refer to namespaces, i.e, prefixes of content names that correspond to a producer. Recall that a content name is a URI-like string composed of arbitrary number of elastic name segments, separated by a '/' character. For example, consider a content named:
The leftmost part, /edu/uni-X/ics/cs, defines this content's original producer's location. Subsequent name segments get increasingly specific, defining, e.g., location of the content in a directory structure on the producer.
KRB-CCN leverages this hierarchical name structure to implement AC policies based on content prefixes. For example, to grant Alice permission to re-/edu/uni-X/ics/cs/faculty/bob/* and /edu/uni-X/ics/cs/students/*
Protocol
To retrieve protected content, C r must go through all of KRB-CCN's three phases, in sequence: authentication, authorization, and content retrieval. As discuss below, transition between phases is automated on the consumer side, i.e., it requires no extra actions. Table 1 summarizes our notation.
Authentication:
The first phase on KRB-CCN verifies consumer identity via authentication. The authentication protocol in Figure 2 is executed between C r and TGT-Prod. If it succeeds, C r receives a TGT, used in the authorization phase, as proof that C r 's identity has been recently verified.
C r starts by issuing an interest with TGT suffix in the content name (e.g., /uni-X/ics/TGT). This interest carries as payload consumer's UID, i.e, C r 's username. Hence, the actual interest name also contains a hash of the payload as its suffix 2 . The interest is routed by CCN towards TGT-Prod. Upon the interest, 
Random λ-bits number generation ct ← Enck(pt) Authenticated Encryption of pt using symmetric key k pt ← Deck(ct) Decryption of ct using symmetric key k ct ← Encpk(pt) Authenticated encryption of pt using public key pk pt ← Decsk(ct) Decryption of ct using secret key sk TGT-Prod looks up U ID in its user database and retrieves the corresponding public key. The protocol assumes that, when a user enrolls in the system, a public/private key-pair is generated. Alternatively, a password can be used for the same purpose, as discussed later. Once TGT-Prod successfully locates the user and retrieves the public-key, it proceeds with TGT generation. Otherwise, it replies with a special error content message indicating unknown user. TGT is an encrypted structure with three fields: U ID, k CGT , and expiration date t 1 . It is encrypted using k A -a long-term symmetric key shared between TGT-Prod and CGT-Prod. Only CGT-Prod can decrypt and access cleartext fields of a TGT. Since C r needs to present the TGT to CGT-Prod during the authorization phase, U ID binds the TGT to C r . This same U ID is used later for namespace access rights verification. CGT-Prod uses t 1 to verify whether a TGT is still valid. TGT expiration time is a realm-specific (and usually realm-wide) parameter reflecting the duration of a typical user authenticated session, e.g., 8 hours. After TGT expires, C r needs to repeat the authentication protocol with TGT-Prod. A TGT also contains a short-term symmetric key k CGT , encrypted separately for CGT-Prod and C r . The purpose of k CGT is to allow C r and CGT-Prod to communicate securely in the subsequent authorization protocol phase. In addition to the TGT, TGT-Prod generates token C CGT , which contains the same t 1 and k CGT encrypted with the pk C associated with U ID.
To transmit the TGT to C r , TGT-Prod responds with a content message containing the TGT and token C CGT , which is routed by CCN back to C r . C r cannot decrypt, access, or modify the TGT due to the use of authenticated encryption. C r decrypts token C CGT and caches the TGT for the duration of t 1 , along with k CGT . The TGT is presented to CGT-Prod every time C r needs to request authorization for a new namespace.
Consumer
TGT-Prod I.name = TGT Name 
Authorization:
The authorization phase (Figure 3) is executed between C r and CGT-Prod. It requires C r to have a valid TGT, acquired from the authentication phase described above. Upon successful completion of the authorization protocol, C r obtains a namespace-specific CGT, which demonstrates C r 's authorization to access a particular restricted content namespace. However, the CGT does not reveal C r 's identity to the content producer; C r 's authorization is ascertained based on possession of a correct session key.
C r starts the protocol by sending an interest with name set to CGT Name. The payload includes the namespace prefix N (e.g., /edu/uni-X/ics/cs/students/ alice/*) for which authorization is being requested and a non-expired TGT. Optionally, if confidentiality for namespace N is an issue, C r can compute Enc k CGT (N ). instead of sending N in clear. When CGT-Prod receives this interest, it uses k A (long-term symmetric key shared by TGT-Prod and CGT-Prod) to decrypt the TGT and obtains U ID, t 1 and k CGT . Next, CGT-Prod checks TGT for expiration. It then optionally (if encryption was used in the interest)
If the TGT is successfully verified, CGT-Prod invokes verifyPolicyAndFetchKey procedure, which (1) fetches AC rules for user U ID; (2) verifies if N is an authorized prefix for U ID; and (3) returns k P -symmetric key associated with the producer for N . k P is later used to encrypt the CGT such that only the appropriate producer can decrypt it.
Similar to a TGT, a CGT carries an expiration t 2 and a fresh key k N . The latter is used between C r and the content producer for confidentiality and mutual authentication, as discussed later. However, instead of U ID, a CGT includes N , i.e., a CGT proves to the content producer that whoever possesses k N is authorized to access content under N . Also, a token
is sent to C r , such that C r can obtain k N and t 2 .
In response to a CGT interest, C r receives a content packet containing the CGT and token C N . C r decrypts token C N using K CGT and creates a cache entry containing: N , the CGT, k N , and t 2 . This cached information is used (until time t 2 ) in all future requests for content under N . has k N ) can decrypt D . However, in some application scenarios this might be troublesome, e.g.:
-Production of content requires a lot of computation, e.g., expensive encryption. In this case, an adversary can replay legitimate interests previously issued by authorized consumers. The adversary's goal might be to mount a DoS attack on the producer. -The producer might be a peripheral device, e.g., a printer. In this setting, the interest might be a request to print a (perhaps very large) document and returned content D might be a mere confirmation of it having been printed. In this case, the replay attack allows the adversary to print the same document multiple times, resulting in DoS. This issue occurs since the producer does not authenticate C r for each interest. A modified version of the protocol, shown in Figure 5 , addresses the problem. It uses a challenge-response protocol that allows the producer to confirm that C r possesses k N before producing the content or providing service. As a down-side, this incurs an additional round of communication for the challenge-response protocol. Recall that C r must issue three types of interests, for: authentication, authorization, and the actual content request. This process is transparent to the user since KRB-CCN consumer-/client-side code handles these steps by following the work-flow in Figure 6 .
Whenever C r issues an interest, KRB-CCN client intervenes and checks whether the name is part of any restricted namespace. If so, it looks up the local cache of CGT-s to find a CGT for prefix N . If a valid CGT is found, it is added to the interest payload and the interest is issued. A cached and valid CGT can be used to skip the first two phases, allowing authenticated and authorized content retrieval in one round.
If no valid cached CGT is found, KRB-CCN client looks up a cached TGT. If a valid TGT is found, the authentication phase is skipped. The client requests a CGT and uses it to request the actual content. This process takes two rounds.
In the worst case all three phases are executed, which results in three rounds of communication. Since consumers only request TGT and/or CGT-s when these tickets expire, ticket caching also reduces the number of requests (and overall traffic volume) flowing to TGT-Prod and CGT-Prod. In practice, we expect CGTs and TGT-s to be long-lived, i.e., on the order of hours or days, similar to current single sign-on systems. This means that the bulk of authorized content retrieval can be performed in one round. If mutual authentication (per protocol in Figure 5 ) is demanded by the producer, one extra round is required. 
Implementation & Performance Evaluation
This section discusses our KRB-CCN prototype implementation and its performance.
Methodology
KRB-CCN is implemented as an application service running as specific purpose producers that produce tickets. Also, consumer-side code is modified to imple-ment the work-flow for authenticated and authorized content request in Figure 6 . Our implementation uses the CCNx software stack [14] and the cryptographic library Sodium [15] . Both publicly available and written in C. For authenticated PKE operations, we use Sodium Sealed-Boxes [16] , implemented over X25519 elliptic curves. AES256-GCM [17] is used to encrypt-then-MAC, i.e., for authenticated symmetric-key encryption.
Experiments presented in this section were ran on an Intel Core i7-3770 octacore CPU @3.40GHz, with 16GB of RAM, running Linux (Ubuntu 14.04LTS). Content payload sizes for interests were set to 10 kilobytes. Payload sizes of TGT and CGT contents are 228 bytes and 165 bytes, respectively. Each carries the respective ticket/token pair, as described in Section 4. In every experiment, each participating entity's process was assigned as a high priority, and each ran in a single processor core. Unless stated otherwise, results are an average of 10 executions, presented with 95% confidence intervals. Figure 7 presents our network testbed. The goal is to evaluate KRB-CCN's overhead. To avoid topology-specific delays, we used a minimal setup containing a single producer P , TGT-Prod, and CGT-Prod. These entities are interconnected by an unmodified CCNx Athena router.
Experiments
We start by measuring per-request processing times at each producer: TGT-Prod, CGT-Prod, and P . Each of these processes was executed 1, 000 times. Figure 8 presents the distribution, as box-plots, of processing time for verifying an incoming interest and replying with the content (either ticket, or authorized encrypted content) at each producer type. Figure 8 shows that the most computationally expensive part is TGT issuance (about 500µ s per request). Higher computational overhead for TGT issuance makes sense because the authentication token (token C CGT in Figure 2 ) is encrypted with C r 's public key. In case of passwordbased authentication, public key encryption is replaced by much faster symmetric key encryption using a password-derived key. This incurs much lower computational overhead on TGT-Prod.
Times for CGT issuance and content production are around 200µ s and 300µ s, respectively. Time is naturally higher for the latter, since encrypted data is larger. In case of content production, the whole content (10kB) is encrypted. In a CGT request, only the CGT and the token need to be encrypted, resulting in a faster processing time.
To investigate how KRB-CCN entities cope under increasing congestion, we flood them with a massive number of simultaneous interests: from 300 to 3000. We then measure average Round-Trip Time (RTT) per type of issued interest. Figure 9 shows the RTTs for each response type. We also include the RTT for regular CCN content retrieval. Since it incurs no extra processing overhead, the regular content RTT is the lower bound for RTTs in CCNx implementation.
The average RTT for interests for TGT, CGT, and authorized encrypted content are similar. The latter is slightly higher as more data (10kB per interest) must traverse the reverse path back to the consumer. KRB-CCN requests incur in average ∼ 60% higher RTT than unmodified content retrieval. In the largest scale test case, with 3000 simultaneous interests issued for each producer, content replies are received in less than 800ms. Finally, we also measure the overall throughput perceived by the consumer in three possible scenarios:
-Cached TGT and CGT: in this case the consumer requests contents under the same namespace. Therefore, the same (non-expired) cached CGT can be used for authorized content retrieval, allowing the client to skip the authentication and authorization phases. -Cached TGT only: this is the case in which no AC ticket caching happens. It happens when the consumer always requests contents under different namespaces or because the realm owner demands consumers to request a fresh CGT for each content. In this case only the authentication part of the protocol is skipped at each request.
-No caching: This is the case in which the realm owner does not allow single sign-on through TGT caching nor authorization reuse through CGT caching. Three requests (authentication, authorization, and content retrieval) are required for each content packet.
Recall that issuance of appropriate interests in each of the cases is automatically handled by KRB-CCN client software running on the consumer.
For each of the above cases, we gradually increase the rate of interests requested per second until throughput reaches its asymptotic limit. By analyzing throughput results, presented in Figure 10 , we can observe the benefit of ticket caching. When both TGT and CGT caching are enabled, the client perceived throughput is higher than in the other cases, as actual content can be retrieved with a single interest. Conversely, caching only TGT-s is still better than not caching any type of ticket, because in this case the authentication phase can be skipped.
Related Work
Previous related efforts provide other types of security services currently available in IP-based networks. ANDaNA [18] is an anonymity service analogous to Tor [19] that uses CCN application-layer onion routing. Mosko, et al. [20] proposed a TLS-like key exchange protocol for building secure sessions for ephemeral end-to-end security in CCN. Similar to IPSec-based VPNs [21] , CCVPN [22] is a network-layer approach for providing content confidentiality and interest name privacy via secure tunnels between physically separated private networks.
There are several CCN-based techniques that implement so-called ContentBased Access Control (CBAC). They tend to rely on content encryption under appropriate consumer keys to enforce AC. A group-based AC scheme for early versions of CCN was proposed in [3] . Policies tie groups of consumers to content, ensuring that only consumers belonging to authorized groups can decrypt restricted content. Similarly, Misra et al. [4] proposed an AC scheme based on broadcast encryption [23, 24] . Wood et al. [5] proposed several AC schemes based on proxy re-encryption [25, 26] to enable consumer personalized content caching. An attribute-based AC system, using attribute-based cryptography [27, 28] was proposed in [6] . CCN-AC [7] is a framework that unifies CBAC-type methods by providing a flexible encryption-based AC framework. It relies on manifest-based content retrieval specification (defined in CCNx 1.0 [29] ) to enable flexible and extensible AC policy specification and enforcement. A similar approach is proposed in NDN-NBAC [8] framework. In these frameworks, data owners generate and distribute private keys to consumers via out-of-band channels. Producers receive corresponding public keys also via out-of-band channels. These public keys are used to encrypt one-time (per-content) symmetric keys.
In a different vein, Ghali et al. [9] proposed an Interest-Based Access Control (IBAC) scheme, wherein access to protected content is enforced by making names secret and unpredictable -based on encryption with keys known only to authorized consumers. Compared with CBAC, IBAC has the advantage of preserving interest name privacy and allowing content caching. However, IBAC must be used in conjunction with CBAC to preclude unauthorized content retrieval via replay of previously issued obfuscated interest names.
In all schemes discussed above, authentication, authorization/AC, and confidentiality are often convoluted. In particular, producers are assumed to be implicitly responsible for authentication and authorization. This implies dealing with identity management and thus violating consumer privacy. Moreover, authentication and AC are enforced on a per-content basis which is unscalable and expensive. To the best of our knowledge KRB-CCN is the first comprehensive approach to address these issues by (1) separating authentication, authorization and content production among distinct entities; and (2) issuing re-usable authentication and authorization tickets for restricted namespaces.
Conclusions
We presented KRB-CCN -a comprehensive design for handling authentication, authorization, and access control in private CCN networks, while preserving consumer privacy. KRB-CCN is transparent to consumers and incurs fairly low overhead. We analyzed KRB-CCN security and assessed its performance based on a prototype implementation. Experimental results show that KRB-CCN is a practical and efficient means of providing multiple security services in private (stub AS) CCNs.
Appendix A: KRB-CCN Security Analysis
We now discuss security of KRB-CCN design presented in Section 4. We start by introducing the assumed adversary model and then split security analysis into 3 parts: user authentication, authorization, and content.
Adversary Model
We consider the worst-case scenario: C r , that does not have a valid CGT or TGT, wants to fetch certain content. Thus, C r must engage in KRB-CCN authentication (Figure 2 ), authorization (Figure 3 ), and authorized content retrieval (Figure 4 or 5, depending on the producers' requirements). TGT-Prod and CGT-Prod are trusted parties.
Adversary Goals and Capabilities: The adversary succeeds if it: (1) retrieves and decrypts unauthorized content; (2) retrieves any session key (k CGT , k N ) or long-term key (k A , k P ); or (3) forges tickets (TGT or CGT), tokens, or contents, leading C r to believe that such forgeries were generated by honest parties; We consider a generic adversary Adv that is ubiquitous within a given KRB-CCN realm. Adv can perform the following actions:
-Compromise and deploy compromised routers: We allow Adv to compromise any number of existing CCN routers on the path between communication end-points. Hence, Adv learns all information in the routers and can change it at will. This includes changing FIB, PITs and content caches. We also allow Adv to deploy its own compromised routers. -Eavesdrop, analyze, and replay messages: Adv can observe all CCN messages. Moreover, Adv can record and replay any traffic at will. -Issue interests and publish content: Adv can deploy its own malicious consumers and producers. Thus, Adv can issue arbitrary interests and produce arbitrary content under its owned namespace.
Note: Protecting software and hardware of consumers or producers is out of scope for KRB-CCN. In particular, hardware and software exploits or malware are not considered in our analysis. Similar to IP-based Kerberos, KRB-CCN is an authentication and authorization system for secure computing platforms communicating over an untrusted (CCN) network. We analyze KRB-CCN security in a top-down fashion. Security of content depends on security of the authorization phase, which, in turn, relies on secure user authentication. Therefore, we start by arguing that content retrieval is secure as long as authorization is secure. Then, we show that authorization is secure if user authentication is secure. Finally, we argue security of authentication by showing that only the owner of a certain user identity can gain access to content by claiming such identity. These notions are formalized bellow.
Content Retrieval Security
Content retrieval security means guaranteeing Property 1 (below) in case of content retrieval without consumer authentication. When consumer authentication is required, secure content retrieval implies both Properties 1 and 2.
Property 1 Given an interest containing a CGT in the format CGT ← Enc k P (N ||k N ||t 2 ) as its payload, assuming that k N is only known by C r and k P is only known by producer P r, it must hold that:
1. P r only replies to valid (non-expired and authentic) CGT-s issued by CGT-Prod and only P r can decrypt such CGT-s; 2. A valid CGT for N can not be used to retrieve contents that do not belong to namespace N ; 3. Only C r can decrypt content generated by P r in response to an interest containing such CGT; 4. C r can check content authenticity (i.e., whether content originated at P r ) and integrity.
Claim 1 KRB-CCN content retrieval protocol ( Figure 4 ) retains Property 1.
Proof (sketch) 1 Item (1) is assured because only CGT-Prod knows k P and authenticated encryption with k P is used to encrypt CGT. Moreover, the expiration t 2 is checked before issuing content replies. Item (2) follows from the integrity of received CGT (guaranteed by item 1) and the fact that P r checks if the received request is for content that has the prefix N . Item (3) is true because content replies are encrypted under k N , which is only known by C r . Item (4) is assured by the use of authenticated encryption using k N . Only P r has k N , because k N is transmitted inside CGT, which is encrypted with k P . Therefore, C r can be sure that such content was in fact generated by P r and also verify the received content integrity.
Property 2
Given an interest containing a CGT in the format CGT ← Enc k P (N ||k N ||t 2 ) as its payload, if k N is only known by consumer C r and k P is only known by producer P r, only C r is able to use such CGT to get P r to execute D ← ProduceData(I.name).
Claim 2 KRB-CCN content retrieval protocol with consumer authentication (Figure 5) retains Properties 1 and 2.
Proof (sketch) 2 The proof that content retrieval protocol with consumer authentication has Property 1 is equivalent to Proof 1. Property 2 is achieved because, in the protocol in Figure 5 , P r also plays a challenge response protocol with C r , guaranteeing that C r knows K N before executing D ← ProduceData(I.name).
Both properties assume that K P is only known to CGT-Prod and P r . This key is shared between them when P r enrolls into a KRB-CCN realm. The properties also assume that K N is only known to consumer C r , which follows from authorization security, discussed in Section 7.3.
Authorization Security
Authorization security is represented by Property 3.
Property 3 Given an authorization request interest for namespace N with T GT ← Enc k A (UID||t 1 ||k CGT ) as payload, assuming that k CGT is only known by consumer C r and k A is shared between CGT-Prod and TGT-Prod, it must hold that:
1. CGT-Prod will only reply to valid (non-expired and authentic) TGT-s issued by TGT-Prod and only CGT-Prod is able to decrypt such TGT-s; 2. A CGT is only issued if the UID in the TGT has access to namespace N ; 3. Only C r is able to retrieve and verify integrity and authenticity of k N ; Claim 3 KRB-CCN authorization protocol (Figure 3) retains Property 3.
Proof (sketch) 3 Item (1) follows from the use of authenticated encryption with k A to encrypt the TGT and from the expiration verification of t 1 . Recall that k A is only shared between CGT-Prod and TGT-Prod. Item (2) is guaranteed by the integrity of received TGT (item (1)) and by the verification in the AC Policy database performed by CGT-Prod. Item (3) holds because k N is encrypted with k CGT , generating token C N (and k CGT is only known by C r ). Therefore, only C r can decrypt token C N and obtain k N . Integrity of k N is verifiable by C r due to the use of authenticated encryption to generate token C N .
Property 3 ensures that CGT-s are only issued to authorized consumers because only those are able to use k CGT to decrypt token C N and retrieve k N . The only missing link in KRB-CCN security is to ensure that if a given C r has k CGT such C r is in fact the owner of UID identity in the TGT. This is discussed next, in Section 7.4.
Authentication Security
Authentication security relies on making sure that only the owner of a claimed UID is able to retrieve k CGT , i.e., the key included in the TGT issued for UID. This is stated by the following property:
Property 4 Given an identity represented by (U ID, sk C , pk C ), where pk C is a public-key know to TGT-Prod and sk C is the associated secret-key only know to C r -the owner of UID. It must hold that , for an issued TGT ← Enc k A (UID||t 1 ||k CGT ), only C r is able to retrieve the key k CGT . Moreover C r can verify integrity and authenticity of k CGT .
Claim 4 KRB-CCN authentication protocol (Figure 2) retains Property 4.
Proof (sketch) 4 Since token C CGT is encrypted using pk C , only the owner of UID can decrypt it and recover k CGT . Integrity and authenticity of k CGT are verifiable due to the use of authenticated encryption.
In the password-based version of KRB-CCN, instead of encrypting under a public key, TGT-Prod would generate token C CGT by encrypting with a symmetric key derived from password. Presumably, only the user that owns U ID would know that secret password and be able to generate the same key to decrypt token C CGT . This approach shares the same characteristics and challenges (e.g., password strength, dictionary attacks, password memorability) of any passwordbased authentication. Password-based authentication is an option in KRB-CCN design. However, discussing specific challenges of password based authentication, though interesting, is not in the scope of the present work.
Discussion
By retaining Properties 1, 2, 3, and 4, KRB-CCN ensures secure authentication, AC, content integrity, and content confidentiality. As KRB-CCN protocol runs on consumers and producers, compromised routers and/or eavesdroppers are not able to violate what is guaranteed by the aforementioned properties.
Replay attacks and spoofed messages do not allow Adv to retrieve (unencrypted) content. If the content production is heavyweight, DoS via replay can be ruled out by enforcing mandatory mutual authentication (protocol in Figure 5) .
In addition to the security services discussed in this section, KRB-CCN preserves consumer privacy. Producers only need to verify CGT-s authenticity and integrity, instead of consumers' identities. CGT-s do not carry UIDs, but instead associated keys, allowing the system to remain secure while preserving privacy. CGT-s are issued for namespaces (and not for complete content names). Thus, not even CGT-Prod (which knows the consumer UID) is able to predict which content will be requested by a consumer after issuing a CGT.
With ticket (TGT and CGT) caching, authentication and authorization can be skipped for subsequent interest within the same namespace. Therefore, most of the times KRB-CCN only requires low-cost (symmetric key) cryptographic operations from consumers/producers.
